

TYPOLOGY OF CONDITIONALS AND CONDITIONALS IN HAYA<sup>1</sup>

Sukari Salone

UCLA

and

University of Dar-es-Salaam

In this article, I discuss my analysis of conditional sentences in Haya. Haya belongs to a subset of Bantu languages in which tense distinctions are made consistently. Every grammatical sentence of Haya will be marked for tense, hence, I have called Haya a "tense-prominent" language. This contrasts with other African languages (including some other Bantu languages) in which aspectual distinctions are made in some sentences where no overt tense markers are present (aspect-prominence). I have shown that, for some languages, there seems to be a connection between the type of tense/aspect system that prevails and the syntactic distinctions made among unreal and real conditional sentences. Many interesting generalizations are made about the nature of unreality in language, which may have consequences for further studies in the area of syntax and semantics.

0. Conditionals Defined

Since the terminology used in studies on conditional sentences is so profuse, I will explain the way I use these terms in the following paper. Conditionals can be classed semantically into three categories:

1. *Simple Conditionals* state that a proposition results if another proposition holds. Simple conditionals typically allow the same range of tense distinctions that is found in simple declarative sentences.

- (1) If you go to the store, I will cook. (future simple)
- (2) If John agreed, Mary disagreed. (simple past)
- (3) If the sun shines, the birds sing. (simple present)

---

<sup>1</sup>I would like to thank those persons who so patiently and generously served as language consultants, including: Mrs. Helen Mariki (Chagga), Mr. Akintole (Yoruba), and Mr. M. Adetoye (Yoruba). A special thanks to Mr. Ernest Byarushingo who while serving as my Haya consultant, contributed invaluable comments and suggestions throughout the duration of this project. Finally, I would like to thank Profs. T. Hinnebusch, P. Schachter and S. Thompson for having read and made comments on an earlier version of this paper.

2. *Hypothetical Conditionals* are conditional sentences in which the antecedent introduces a hypothetical or imaginary proposition (where that proposition is not assumed to be false).

- (4) If I saw Sidney Poitier in person, I'd faint.
- (5) If the King of Siam were to come to dinner, I wouldn't serve him Chinese noodles.

3. *Counterfactual Conditionals* are conditional sentences in which the antecedent asserts a proposition which is assumed to be false.

- (6) If I were you, I wouldn't talk like that.
- (7) If he had cooked, I would have eaten.
- (8) If he had stolen the money, he wouldn't have turned himself in.

Notice that some sentences which are counterfactual semantically can have the syntactic structure usually associated with hypotheticals, i.e. (6) above. Thus, Schachter [1971] has proposed a syntactic typology which groups (4), (5), and (6) above in contrast to (7) and (8). She calls them present and past subjunctives, respectively.

Conditional sentences have been mostly the concern of philosophers. The main issue which has concerned philosophers has been the verifiability of contrary-to-fact conditionals. What we know thus far is that the truth value of a counterfactual sentence cannot be derived from the truth value of its component parts, at least not in any axiomatic fashion. In any case, my data will have very little, if anything, to offer in solving this.

There are, however, interesting questions regarding the issue of syntax and semantics, which my data can shed some light on. I will be concerned, in particular, with two problems. The first has to do with the notions *Reality* and *Unreality* in language. All languages make some systematic distinction between real and unreal sentences, as the following examples show:

Real: If they bring the food, we bring the wine.

Unreal: If they were to bring the food, we would bring the wine.

In most languages, this contrast is found in conditional sentences. Many languages, in addition, show this contrast in non-conditional sentences:

Real: I will kill him when I see him.

Unreal: I would kill him, but I don't have a gun.

We learn from philosophers, e.g. Goodman [1954], that future simple conditionals are semantically unreal. That is, they share certain assumptions with hypothetical and counterfactual conditional sentences. However, the syntactic facts of neither English nor Haya reflect this situation. That is, future simple conditionals will be shown to show a syntactic affinity with other real conditionals, e.g. simple past or

simple present, rather than with other unreal conditionals, hypotheticals and counterfactuals. We might want to say then that in these languages the syntactic facts do not reflect the semantic reality. In section 2.0 we will discuss this problem in detail, bringing data from languages which show a close syntactic relationship between future simples and other unreal conditional sentences, for contrast. We will conclude that languages differ as to how they segment the semantic contrast between Reality and Unreality. We will see that the syntactic facts of English and Haya support a slightly different analysis of the unreal/real contrast in language than that manifested by Yoruba and Chagga.

The second problem has to do with counterfactuality. Counterfactuals in some languages e.g. English and Haya, may be expressed syntactically as either present or past subjunctive.

Pres subj: If I were you, I would wear this one.

Past subj: If I had gone to the store, I would have bought meat.

Both these sentences have the same kinds of assumptions. They assume the negation of the antecedent. What does this, then, suggest about the nature of counterfactuality? In searching for an answer to this question, some interesting observations are brought forth about types of counterfactual sentences.

### 1. Simple Conditionals

The antecedent of the Simple Conditional in Haya is introduced by *ká* 'if'. *Ká* introduces the antecedents of all Simple Conditionals and most Imaginary ones. In many languages such a conditional clause introducer alone marks the sentence as being conditional. That is, the tense and modal possibilities are pretty much as they are in simple declarative sentences, e.g.

English: If Jack voted for the resolution, Bill voted against it.  
(simple past)

If today is his birthday, he is out celebrating.  
(simple present)

The Simple Conditional in Haya is unlike the Simple Conditional in English in that Haya indicates the mood of the sentence by way of an affix inside the antecedent clause. This affix *la* is the future 1 indicator, which takes on a special meaning in conditional sentences. It is used to mark the sentence as a simple conditional sentence rather than, say, a declarative one. *la* is attached to the auxiliary verb *ba* 'be', leaving the main verb free to carry the semantic tense marker for that clause.

- (9) *ká* John *a-!a-ba* *y-á-ikiriza* Jack *y-á-yânga*  
if pro-Future 1-aux pro-Past 1-agree pro-Past 1-disagree  
'if John agreed (earlier today), Jack disagreed'

Before going further, let us briefly consider the Haya tense system, which shows more time distinctions than that of English. In Haya, there is a three-way distinction in past time:

- Past 1 (P1) = recent past (earlier today)  
 Past 2 (P2) = semi-recent past (yesterday)  
 Past 3 (P3) = distant past (anytime before yesterday)

In like manner, Haya distinguishes two future tenses:

- Future 1 (F1) = near future (tomorrow)  
 Future 2 (F2) = distant future (after tomorrow)

There are a number of aspectual markers as well (e.g. progressive and perfect). Haya, like English, requires the presence of a tense marker in every sentence. This contrasts with many African languages which can have aspect markers in a sentence without marking the sentence for tense (e.g. Hausa, Yoruba). I refer later to languages with tense systems like Haya and English as being *tense prominent*. The languages typified by Yoruba and Hausa are what I call *aspect prominent*.

The following are examples of Simple Conditionals in Haya:

- (10) P1 ká John a-la-ba<sup>2</sup> y-á-ikiriza Jack y-á-yânga  
 if pro-Fl-aux pro-Pl-agree pro-Pl-disagree  
 'if John agreed, Jack disagreed' (earlier today)
- (11) P2 ká John a-la-ba á-íkiriz-é<sup>2</sup> Jack a-yang-íle  
 if pro-Fl-aux pro-agree-P2 pro-disagree-P2  
 'if John agreed, Jack disagreed' (yesterday)
- (12) P3 ká John a-la-ba y-a-íkiriz-e Jack a-ka-ânga  
 if pro-Fl-aux pro-Pl-agree-P2 pro-P3-disagree  
 'if John agreed, Jack disagreed' (a few days ago)
- (13) Prog ká ómushana gu-la-ba ni-gu jwá tu-imûk-e  
 if sun pro-Fl-aux prog-pro-shine we-get up-subjunct.  
 'if the sun is shining, we should get up'
- (14) Pres ká á-la-ba a-li mutâmbi inyé aho n-di ntâle  
 if pro-Fl-aux pro-cop doctor I then pro-cop lion  
 'if he's a doctor, I'm a lion'

---

<sup>2</sup>/a/ 3rd sg. [y] / \_\_\_\_\_ a Pl  
 pronoun

I have omitted examples of future simple conditionals, as they are covered in the next section. Remember that the Fl marker in the above examples is being used in a special way, to mark the clause as being "conditional". We shall see subsequently that in all conditional sentences some type of modal is affixed onto the verb, which indicates the mood of the sentence. In Simple Conditionals that marker is *la*. In Imaginatives that marker is *ku* (as will be shown subsequently).

Since future conditionals were omitted, the following informal statements for the formation of simple conditionals must be taken as tentative:

- The antecedent of Simple Conditionals is introduced by *ka* 'if';
- all simple Conditionals require the presence of the future marker *la* in the antecedent. *la* is affixed onto the auxiliary *ba* in the position where tense markers normally occur (between the subject pronoun or subject concord and the verb).

## 2. Future Simple Conditionals

Semantically, the class of Unreality Conditionals consists of hypotheticals, counterfactuals and future simple conditionals. An interesting fact is that in many languages both hypothetical and counterfactual sentences make use of a syntactic marker of Unreality, e.g. *would* in English. Future simple conditionals in contrast, lack such an Unreality marker. In fact, future simple conditionals are syntactically like Real Conditionals (other simple conditionals).

In the following, I discuss the Haya data with respect to how closely the syntactic facts of future simple conditionals correspond to the fact of their being unreal semantically. The Haya situation will be shown to parallel that of English, where future simple conditionals are always syntactically distinct from hypotheticals and counterfactuals. This may not prove to be the general case in Bantu, however, as there are languages, e.g. Chagga, which, upon preliminary investigation, contrast with Haya in this respect. These languages show the future marker being used in some imaginative sentences.

The following are examples of future simple conditionals in Haya:

- (15) *k-á-la-ijá*            *n-da-mu-bôna*  
 if-he-Fl-comes I-Fl-him-see  
 'if he comes, I will see him'

- (16) ká n-<sup>3</sup>da-mu-bóna n-da-mu-gamb-íla  
 if I-Fl-him-see I-Fl-him-tell-app  
 'if I see him, I will tell him'
- (17) ká a-la-ikílliza n-da-kjá n-ku-many-íſ-e  
 if he-Fl-agree I-Fl-come I-you-know-cause-subjunctive  
 'if he agrees, I'll come and inform you'
- (18) ná íwe ká o-la-ikíllizá áho tu-la-many-isa ábándi bá-íje  
 and you if you-Fl-agree then we-Fl-know-cause others they-come  
 'and if you agree also, then we will inform the others so that they  
 may come'

Future simple conditionals are like other Simple Conditionals in that the Fl indicator is obligatory. Recall that the future indicator *la* is being used to show conditionally in simple conditional sentences. In simple conditionals which are not semantically future, *la* is placed on the auxiliary verb *ba* 'be', leaving the main verb free to carry the appropriate tense indicator for the sentence. Future simple conditional sentences differ from other simples in that the auxiliary *ba* is not used to carry the Fl indicator. The Fl marker is attached directly onto the main verb. The Fl marker in future simple conditionals is ambiguous, showing both futurity and conditionality. We can then revise the rule for simple conditionals to read as follows:

All Simple Conditionals require the presence of the future marker *la* in the antecedent. If the antecedent is semantically future, then the future marker is attached to the main verb. If the antecedent is semantically non-future, the auxiliary *-ba* is used to carry the future indicator, leaving the main verb free to carry the semantic tense marker of the sentence.

There is one type of sentence in which the Fl marker (*la*) is not found. In sentences for which the time reference of the antecedent is semantically distant future, the F2 marker *li* is used in place of *la*, as the following example shows:

- (19) k-áøli-ijá n-di-mu-bóna  
 if-he-F2-comes I-F2-him-see  
 'if he comes, I will see him' (next week)

This calls for revising our rule to read as follows:

Most simple conditionals are marked as such by the presence of the future marker *la* in the antecedent. The exception is where the antecedent itself is interpreted as distant future, in which case the F2 marker *li* is used.

---

<sup>3</sup>The variant forms of the future marker can be accounted for by the following rule:

l → d/n

It seems apparent that the F1 marker *la* has achieved a status in simple conditionals beyond its usage as an indicator of future. That is, it is the indicator of *conditionality* in these sentences. I interpret the F1 marker *la* as the "conditional" indicator, and *li* (F2) can be interpreted as such only in certain restricted contexts.

Now to bring the facts of Haya to bear on what we know about the future simple conditionals in other languages, I quote Schachter [1971: 68] on future simple conditionals in English:

"So although the future simple conditional is like the imaginative in indicating unreality, it differs from them in that it is *never* used to indicate divergence from this world."

Schachter says this after finding that in English, future simple conditionals are syntactically like other simple conditionals. Furthermore, she apparently found no syntactic evidence of their being used to show Unreality. We can conclude from this that the syntactic facts of English show a contrast between Unreality and Reality where Unreality excludes future projections about this world. Unreality is restricted to talking about what might happen in some other world (hypothetical) and what didn't happen in this world (counterfactual).

Haya is like English in this respect. Syntactically, future simple conditionals are always kept distinct from imaginary conditionals. The syntax of Haya then supports, as does English, an Unreality/Reality distinction where "unreal" excludes projections into the future in this world.

There are, interestingly, languages where syntax exhibits a closer relationship between future simple sentences and imaginary ones. In the following data from Yoruba and Chagga, I show that some Niger-Congo languages segment Unreal and Real sentences in an interesting way which contrasts with Haya and English. It will be shown that the syntax of these two languages supports the claim that future simple conditionals are semantically unreal.

Past subjunctive conditionals in Yoruba are relatively easy to identify in that they always contain the preverb *ìbá* in their consequent clauses.

(20) a. *bí m bá tete dé ni, ìm-bá bá a nínú ilé*  
 if I INDEF early arrive COPULA I-UNREAL find him at home  
 'if I had come early, I would have found him at home'

b. *bí ó bá se pé ó lè sọ Yorùbá ni, won ìbá ti*  
 if it INDEF be that he able speak COP they UNREAL PERF  
*gbà á*  
 accept him

'if he had been able to speak Yoruba, they would have accepted him'

- c. ì-bá rí esin t'ó ní iye, ì-bá dákú  
I-UNR see horse REL has wings, I-UNR faint

'had I seen a winged horse, I would have fainted'

The antecedent of past subjunctive conditional sentences is usually introduced by the "basic" form of the conditional clause introducer (tí/bí.... bá ). It may be introduced by an expanded form (b)

'if' INDEF

which means 'if it be that' or it may be replaced by the unreality marker ìbá (c).<sup>4</sup> Since the antecedent clause can have variant forms, we can assume that it is the consequent clause which imparts the notion of "contrary-to-factness" in these sentences. That this is the case will become obvious as we consider the following simple conditionals whose antecedents are identical in form to those in the sentences cited above.

- (21) a. bí mo bá lọ sí ilé-awosan, mo máa pàdè òrẹ̀ mi  
if I INDEF go to cinema I fut meet friend my (cf. 20a)  
'if I go to the cinema, I will meet my friend'
- b. bí ó bá jẹ pé irọ̀ ni o pa mǎa jẹ o níyà  
if it INDEF be that a lie COP you tell, I(FUT) punish you (cf. 20b)  
'if its a lie you told, I will punish you'

The fact that the form of the antecedent is not very consistent in Yoruba indicates that it is in the consequent clause that distinctions are marked between types of conditional sentences. We can safely say, for example, that all past subjunctives (counterfactuals) have some form of ìbá in their consequent clauses:

- (22) a. bí mi bá rí esin t'ó ní iye, ì-bá dákú  
if I INDEF see horse REL has wings, I-UNR faint  
'if I had seen a winged horse, I would have fainted'
- b. b'ó bá se pé o lè sọ Yorùbá, wọn ìbá tì<sup>5</sup> gbà  
if-it INDEF be that he able speak Yoruba, they UNREAL PERF accept  
á  
him  
'if he had been able to speak Yoruba, they would have accepted him'
- c. bí mo bá rí i l'ánǎ ì-bá nà á  
if I INDEF see him yesterday, I-UNR beat him  
'if I had seen him yesterday, I would have beaten him'
- d. ì-bá rí i l'ánǎ ì-bá nà á  
I-UNR see him yesterday, I-UNR beat him  
'had I seen him yesterday, I would have beaten him'

<sup>4</sup>The ì of ìbá is deleted after a pronoun, e.g. /mo ìbá/ → [m̀bá].

<sup>5</sup>Insertion of the perfect marker is optional here.

In present subjunctive (hypothetical) sentences, the consequent clause usually does not contain *ìbá*. Interestingly, it usually contains one of the future markers in the language. Occasionally, the *ìbá* "unreal" marker is found in present subjunctive sentences, in which case the sentence is ambiguously interpretable as either a hypothetical or a counterfactual. In sentences like these, the distinction between past and present subjunctive is unimportant. That is, the semantically relevant information is that the sentence is unreal, leaving the tense reference to contextual clues. Below are examples of present subjunctive conditional sentences (compare these to the future simple conditionals in (21)):

- (23) a. *bí ó bá se pé ó gbọ edé-faransé, wọn ó yà a*  
 if it INDEF be that he speak French, they fut hire him  
 'if he spoke French, they would hire him'
- b. *bí m bá rí esin t'ó ni òyè, maã dákú*  
 if I INDEF see horse REL has wings, I(fut) faint  
 'if I saw a winged horse, I would faint'

We know that hypotheticals are unreal and we expect them to have a different syntactic structure from that which is found in real conditional sentences. It is claimed that future simple conditionals are unreal as well. However, using English as an example, we find that future simple conditionals are similar structurally to real conditionals not to unreal ones. In Yoruba, the semantic delineation of Unreals is supported because future simple conditionals and hypothetical conditional sentences are identical structurally. Yoruba then is an example of a language for which unreality includes projections about this world. That is, the syntactic expression of unreality is *not* limited to expressing facts about another world.

Chagga, a Bantu language, behaves in this respect like Yoruba. An imaginary sentence in Chagga can be expressed using either the imaginative marker *we* or the future indicator in the consequent clause.

- (24) John *a-wé icha inú ngí-we-korá machalári*  
 pro-IMAG-come today I-IMAG-cook bananas  
 'if John were to come today, I would cook bananas'
- (25) John *k-a-cha inú ngé-kora machalári*  
 if-pro-come today I(fut)-cook bananas  
 'if John were to come today, I would cook bananas'

---

<sup>6</sup>There are three different future indicators in the language. They happen to have come about as a result of dialectal variation, therefore there is no meaning difference. They are as follows: (1) *yio* (which surfaces as *o*), (2) *a* and *maa*.

Interestingly, however, the reverse is not true, i.e. a future simple sentence does not have the option of being expressed with the imaginative marker *we*. Given this, we might say that the future indicator is the general unreality marker, i.e. it can be used to show unreality in this world or of another world. The imaginary marker *we*, on the other hand is limited to showing unreality outside the domain of this world.

We can conclude that the syntactic facts of Yoruba and Chagga support a slightly different analysis of the unreal-real contrast than do the facts of Haya and English. The Yoruba and Chagga data support an analysis of the unreal-real distinction where Unreality includes future projections. The following diagram shows the way the two types of languages show the real-unreal distinction, syntactically.

	<u>REALITY</u>	<u>UNREALITY</u>
English Haya	SIMPLE conditionals (including future)	HYPOTHETICALS - what might happen in some other world, i.e. <i>fiction</i>  COUNTERFACTUALS - what didn't happen in this world, i.e. <i>fact</i>
Yoruba Chagga	SIMPLE conditionals (not including future)	HYPOTHETICALS  COUNTERFACTUALS  FUTURE SIMPLE - what will happen in this world, i.e. <i>forecast</i>

### 3. Imaginary Conditionals

The term *imaginary* is used to refer to that subset of unreal conditionals which indicates divergence from this world. Semantically, Imaginary Conditionals consist of (1) those conditionals which express an imaginary or hypothetical situation, e.g. 'if the Queen came to dinner, I would prepare her favorite dish', and (2) those conditionals which express imaginary situations, but whose antecedents are interpreted as being false, e.g. 'if the Queen had come to dinner, I would have prepared her favorite dish'. Following the analysis of Schachter [1971], I call the form of the first type *present subjunctive* and that of the second type *past subjunctive*. This syntactic terminology is needed because counterfactual sentences are not consistently past subjunctive, as, for example, in a sentence like 'if horses had wings, they could fly'.

Imaginary sentences in general tend to exhibit the following characteristics:

- Their antecedents, like those of simple conditionals, are introduced by a conditional introducer. (In Haya and English the introducer in Imaginary sentences is the same as the introducer of simple conditional sentences.)

- They usually include some type of marker of "imaginativeness", e.g. *would* in English.
- The tense possibilities are usually very restricted. This is because tense distinctions are superfluous in Imaginary sentences, with the exception of past subjunctives, where past tense is crucial to the interpretation of some counterfactual sentences.

Imaginary conditionals in Haya are typical of those found in languages in general. They are introduced by the conditional clause introducer *ká* ; they are distinguished from non-imaginary sentences by the presence of the imaginary marker *ku* ; and the tense possibilities are limited to the following:

present subjunctive = past 1

past subjunctive = perfect (past 1 + past 2)

Before going further, we should consider some examples of Imaginary conditionals:

#### PRESENT SUBJUNCTIVES

- (26) *ká n-a-ku-bona éfarasy' ein' ámabába ti-n-á-ku-amini*  
 if I-Pl-unr-see horse having wings neg-I-Pl-unr-believe

'if I saw a horse with wings, I wouldn't believe it'

- (27) *ká n-a-ku-zileba n-ka-bona<sup>7</sup> nti ego farasi kwo zi-n'*  
 if I-Pl-unr-see I-consec-see that yes horse truly pro-have  
*ébibába n-a-ku-enda ku-zí-lebarga ku-leba nka zi-emile nka*  
 wings I-Pl-unr-go to-them-examine to-see if they-are like  
*éfarâsí ángá nka zi-emile kúndi*  
 horses or if they-are different

'if I looked at them and saw that they were truly horses having wings, I would like to examine them to see if they are like horses or if they are different'

#### PAST SUBJUNCTIVES

- (28) *ká n-a-ku-g-ile omúká n-a-ku-l-ile ébitooke n-énfulú*  
 if I-Pl-unr-go-P2 home I-Pl-unr-eat-P2 bananas and-fish

'if I had gone home, I would have eaten bananas and fish'

- (29) *ká n-a-ku-g-ile Bushûmbá, n-a-ku-leb-ile Má Élesi*  
 if I-Pl-unr-go-P2 I-Pl-unr-see-P2

*tu-gánilá; n-a-ku-hig-ile ákanya kó-ku-gyá Omumwani*  
 we-talk I-Pl-unr-look for-P2 time of-to-go to

---

<sup>7</sup>Ka in Haya is used as a consecutive marker much as it is used in Swahili.

ku-leba omwana wa munyányanzí okwó á-li ku-shomá onu shufúle  
to-see child of sister how he-be to-read in school

'if I had gone to Bushumba, I would have seen "Dona" Alizi so that we could talk; I would have found the time to go to Omumwani to see my nephew . . . how he is doing is school'

This marker *ku* which I call a marker of "imaginativeness" probably derives from the infinitive marker *ku*, but its usage in these sentences is strikingly different from its usage as an infinitive marker in several important ways. Firstly, the infinitive plus verb can never occur with a subject prefix. Secondly, the verb in its infinitival form never carries a tense indicator. We saw in the examples given above, however, that both subject prefixes and tense markers are prefixed to the verbs marked by *ku*. For this reason, *-ku-* is considered an imaginary indicator, which derived from the infinitival marker and is equivalent to *would* in English. Evidence that *ku* is in some sense equivalent to *would* is provided when we consider unreal non-conditional sentences, which share certain semantic properties with imaginary sentences.

(30) Kató y-a-ku-ku-is-ílé kyonká t-á-ína mbûndu  
pro-Pl-unr-you-kill-P2 but neg-he-have gun

'Kato *would* kill you, but he doesn't have a gun'

(31) n-a-ku-chumb-ílé kyonká t-á-li-mú majûta  
I-Pl-unr-cook-P2 but neg-loc-be-loc oil

'I *would* cook but there's no oil'

(32) Kató y-a-ku-chúmbá bwaigolo  
pro-Pl-unr-cook tonight

'Kato *may* cook dinner tonight'

(33) n-a-ku-ku-boná nyénkya  
I-pl-unr-you-see tomorrow

'I *may* see you tomorrow'

(34) n-a-ku-chumb-ílé kyonká y-a-ba t-á-li-mú majûta  
I-Pl-unr-cook-P2 but pro-Pl-aux neg-pro-cop-loc oil

'I *would* have cooked but there was no oil'

The preceding sentences are semantically like imaginative conditional sentences in the following ways: either they imply the negation of the clause marked by the presence of *ku* (30,31,34), or they imply some doubt as to the actualization or realization of the action expressed by the verb (32,33). Interestingly, those sentences which I claim imply the negation of the antecedent (30,31,34) use the tense frame that is used in counterfactual conditional sentences. We know that counterfactual conditionals imply the negation of their antecedents. Notice also that (30), (31), and (34) can be paraphrased by conditional sentences. Similarly, those sentences which I claim imply some doubt as to the actualization of the action expressed by the verb take the tense frame usually associated with hypothetical conditional sentences.

Another point worth noting is that only two tense possibilities are allowed in imaginary conditionals. Haya, like English, makes a syntactic distinction between present and past subjunctives. Present subjunctives require the Past 1 indicator and past subjunctives require usage of the perfect marker (P1 prefix and P2 suffix). This phenomenon was not included as one of the general characteristics of Imaginary Conditionals because, in fact, many languages lack such a distinction. Chagga and some dialects of Swahili are examples of such languages. In these languages, one imaginary marker is used to express both hypotheticals and counterfactuals. The only indication that the sentence is counterfactual would come from contextual clues (yesterday, last year, etc.). The following examples from Swahili show this:

(35) kama ni-nge-kwenda nyumba-ni kiangazi ki-ja-cho  
if I-imag-go house-to summer pro-come-rel

ni-nge-penda ku-kaa nyumba-ni na wazee wangu kwa  
I-imag-like to-stay home-at with parents my for

siku chache  
days few

'if I were to go home this coming summer I would like to stay  
at home with my parents for a few days'

(36) kama ni-nge-kwenda nyumba-ni kiangazi ki-li-cho-pita  
if I-imag-go home-to summer pro-pst-rel-pass

ni-nge-penda ku-kaa nyumba-ni na wazee wangu kwa siku chache  
I-imag-like to-stay home-at with parents my for days few

'if I had gone home last summer I would have like to have stayed  
with my parents for a few days'

(37) ngí-we-henda shúle ngí-we-soma ki-ingerésa  
I-imag-go school I-imag-study English

'if I went to school, I would study English'

(38) ngí-we-henda shúle mfiri fo káwí ngí-we-kulosha kiingeréza  
I-imag-go school day of 2nd I-imag-study English

'if I had gone to school last Tuesday, I would have studied English'

Interestingly, this data contradicts the standard textbook account of the imaginary marker in Swahili, which makes claims like the following from Ashton [1944]:

"When the supposition is possible of realization, the -nge tense is used both in the protasis (condition) of a sentence and in the apodosis (consequence).

mfi huu u-nge-anguka, u-nge-ni-ua  
tree this pro-imag-fall, pro-imag-me-kill

'If this tree should fall, it would kill me.'

If the supposition is regarded as not having been realized the -ngali- tense is used—both in the protasis and apodosis."

mti huu u-ngali-anguka, u-ngali-ni-ua

'If this tree had fallen, it would have killed me.'

The markers *nge* (Swahili) and *we* (Chagga) indicate that the sentence is imaginary. Interestingly, these languages which make no syntactic distinction between present and past subjunctives (Yoruba, as well) are what I have called *non-tense prominent*. That is, in these languages, aspect and mood markers can be used, where no syntactic reference is made to tense. It seems natural that languages in which tense is often subordinate to aspectual distinctions in simple sentences would extend this pattern to conditional sentences. Thus, these languages mark the "imaginariness" of the sentence syntactically, leaving the time reference to be contextually determined.

Haya and English, on the other hand, represent *tense prominent* languages. These are languages in which aspectual references can only be made with reference to a particular tense marker, e.g. present progressive, past progressive, future progressive. This tense prominence is carried over into conditional sentences, giving a syntactic distinction between present and past subjunctives among Imaginary conditionals.

We say in section 2 that a typology can be drawn among languages also in terms of how they express syntactically the distinction between Unreality and Reality. Those languages for which Unreality includes future projections into this world are the same languages which show no contrast between present and past subjunctives. This seems not accidental. Among Unreal Conditionals, the difference between future simples and imaginaries (hypotheticals and counterfactuals) can be looked at as one of tense (future versus non-future). The languages which include future simples with other Unreals are ignoring this tense distinction. These are the same languages which show no distinction between present and past subjunctives—the aspect prominent languages. Those languages, in contrast, which exclude future simples from the Unreal group, may be doing so because the tense distinction here is important. In like manner, these languages always contrast present from past subjunctives, syntactically.

I have tried to show that the typology drawn on the basis of the Reality-Unreality distinction is not completely separate from that which is drawn on the basis of presence versus absence of a contrast between present and past subjunctive conditional sentences.

Returning now to imaginary sentences in Haya. We saw earlier that imaginary sentences are introduced by *ká*. There is, however, an optional

clause introducer which can be used to introduce the antecedents of imaginary conditionals. This introducer is *kubá*. Morphologically, *kubá* is the infinitival form of the auxiliary verb *-ba* that we saw in the discussion of simple conditionals (see sections 1 and 2). It has been suggested that "unreal" *ku* derives from the infinitival marker and has achieved a special meaning in imaginary sentences. Apparently when *kubá* functions to introduce imaginary conditional sentences, it is not functioning simply as an infinitival. Rather, *ku* is functioning to show imaginativeness, as the antecedent lacks this marker only in case it is introduced by *kubá*.

- (39) *kubá* *n-a-ba-ile* *n-donz-il-we* *ku-gyá* *dar es Saláám*  
*if(unr)* I-Pl-aux-P2 I-choose-P2-pass. to-go  
*ku-wá-kilisha* *ábanafunzi* *ba* *Los Ángeles*, *ekyámbele*  
to-them-represent students of first  
*n-denga* *n-a-ku-shemeleil-we* *múno*  
I-think I-Pl-unr-be happy-pass. a lot  
'if I had been chosen to go to Dar es Salaam . . . to represent  
the students of Los Angeles, first . . . I think, I would have  
been very happy'

I translate *kubá* as 'if it were that'.

In summary, Imaginary conditionals in Haya are represented as follows:

- Every imaginative conditional is introduced by a conditional clause introducer, either *ká* 'if' or *kubá* 'if it were that'.
- All imaginary sentences contain an affix *ku* on the verbal in the consequent clause to mark the sentence as being unreal. Sentences which are introduced by the conditional introducer *ká* take *ku* in the antecedent. Sentences introduced by unreal *kubá* don't require *ku* in the antecedent.
- There are only two tense possibilities in imaginative conditionals:

Present subjunctives = Past 1

Past subjunctives = Past 1 + Past 2 (perfect)

In the preceding pages I have given a first look at conditional sentences in Haya. It was shown how various markers in the language have been extended in usage to function in conditional clauses. The F1 marker, for example, is obligatory in all simple conditionals. In imaginative conditionals, the modal marking imaginativeness derives from the infinitival marker *ku*. This tendency to mark the mood of the sentence on the verb follows from the highly morphological nature of Bantu languages.

This paper is but a first attempt at describing the system of

conditional sentences in one Bantu language. Undoubtedly, there are many questions left unanswered about conditional sentences, as well as about the state of affairs in the proto-language. If this paper serves to motivate research in other aspects of Haya syntax and in other Bantu languages, its purpose would have been well served.

#### REFERENCES

- Ashton, E.O. 1944. *Swahili Grammar*. London: Longmans.
- Duranti, Alesandro. 1976. "Relative Clauses in Haya." Ms.
- Goodman, Nelson. 1954. *Facts, Fiction, Forecast*. London: The Athlone Press.
- Rowlands, E.C. 1969. *Teach Yourself Yoruba*. London: The English Universities Press.
- Saloné, Sukari. 1976. "Conditionals in Yoruba." Ms.
- Schachter, Jacquelyn C. 1971. "Presupposition and counterfactual conditional sentences." Doctoral dissertation, UCLA.
- Zawawa, Sharifa. 1971. *Kiswahili Kwa Kitendo*. New York: Harper and Row.